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User sanctions influence the legal risk for participants in illegal drug markets. A change in user sanctions
may change retail drug prices, depending on how it changes the legal risk to users, how it changes
the legal risk to dealers, and the slope of the supply curve. Using a novel dataset with rich transaction-level
information, this paper evaluates the impact of recent changes in user sanctions for marijuana on marijuana
prices. The results suggest that lower legal risks for users are associated with higher marijuana prices
in the short-run, which ceteris paribus, implies higher profits for drug dealers. Additionally, the findings
have important implications for thinking about the slope of the supply curve and interpreting previous
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fjc@uic.edu          Over 25 million Americans consumed marijuana in 2005 and there have been over 4 
million arrests for marijuana possession since 2000 (SAMHSA, 2006; FBI, annual).   Given its 
popularity and the widespread belief that its harms are low relative to other illicit substances, a 
significant debate has continued regarding marijuana policy reform in the United States and 
abroad (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001).   The only successful policy reforms that have come out of 
the recent debate involve modified sanctions facing users.  Canada, Germany, Great Britain, 
Portugal, and Spain have all recently adopted policies that dramatically reduce the penalties and 
sanctions faced by users of marijuana (Hall and Pacula, 2003).  Even in the United States there 
has been a softening of sanctions toward individuals caught in possession of small amounts of 
marijuana in many states (Chriqui et al., 2002; Pacula et al., 2003).   
A modest literature has developed examining how these small differences in sanctions 
observed across states in the United States are correlated with differences in marijuana use 
(Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999; Farrelly et al., 2001; Pacula et al., 2003; Williams et al, 2004).  
Many studies find that lower sanctions, typically indicated through reduced jail time and lower 
fines, are associated with greater use although the effect sizes are small and occasionally 
insignificant.  The small or insignificant effect may be explained by one of three possibilities.  
First, the policies may truly have little impact on demand, especially if enforcement is negligible.  
Second, people may not be aware of the sanctions or if they have changed, again suggesting that 
the policies will not affect demand (Pacula, et al., 2005).  Third, if supply is upward sloping as 
with other normal goods there could be an offsetting price effect that reduces the net effect of the 
policies observed in analyses.   
This paper considers this last possibility by examining the role of user sanctions in 
marijuana markets and whether changes in these sanctions, believed to shift demand, influence 
the prices paid by users in local markets.  Economic theory suggests that price will be affected by 
demand side policies if supply is upward sloping, a perfectly reasonable assumption for 
marijuana.  To date virtually no work has been done examining the slope of the supply curve for 
marijuana, presumably due to lack of reliable data given the illegal nature of the good.  However, 
it is possible to infer basic information on the slope of the supply curve by understanding how 
shifts in the demand for marijuana influence the equilibrium level of prices observed in the 
market.     4
In this paper, we use rich transaction-level information from recent marijuana purchases 
made by arrestees who are part of the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Program to 
estimate the impact of state marijuana policies on self-reported price per bulk gram paid.  We 
first develop a model focused exclusively on proximal measures of transaction risk, and then use 
natural variation in state marijuana laws over time and within states to evaluate the impact of 
these demand-side policies on the equilibrium prices of marijuana observed in illegal markets.   
Because it is possible that demand-side policies influence sellers’ risk as well, we test the 
robustness of our findings with respect to these state-policies by considering the impact of other 
demand shifters on price, in particular the beer tax.   The sensitivity analyses support the 
interpretation that reductions in user risk raise price.  There are three implications of these 
findings.  First, the findings support the conclusion that marijuana use is sensitive to changes in 
the legal risks targeting users.  A reduction in sanctions will increase use of marijuana.  Second, 
the supply of marijuana is upward sloping at least in the short run, implying that temporary 
shortages caused by a reduction in supply or an increase in demand will impact market price.  
Third, shortages caused by shifts in demand (such as that generated by a reduction in user 
sanctions) will raise sellers’ profits, ceteris paribus.  
          The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we provide some 
background literature about state marijuana laws, the operation of marijuana markets, and 
marijuana prices.  In Section 3 we discuss how policies targeting users of marijuana might 
influence marijuana prices under alternative assumptions about supply.  In Section 4 we discuss 
the data used for this analysis and present our empirical model in Section 5.  Section 6 presents 
the results from these models and in Section 7 we offer some discussion and conclusion.  
 
1.0   Marijuana Laws, Markets and Price 
1.1  State marijuana laws  
Even though the U.S. federal government retains a strict prohibition on the possession of 
even small amounts of marijuana, there is significant variation across the states in the legal 
penalties associated with this offense (Pacula et al., 2003; Chriqui et al., 2001).   Given that the 
majority of marijuana possession offenses are tried in state courts, state law applies (Ostrom and 
Kauder, 1999).  The proportion of these arrests leading to conviction is unknown, but those 
convicted of marijuana possession are often sentenced to probation and/or a fine, not jail   5
(MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; National Research Council, 2001; Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, 2005).1 Although twelve states are generally recognized as having “decriminalized”2 
possession of small amounts of marijuana, fifteen states have actually eliminated criminal 
sanctions associated with it and another twenty-six states have conditional discharge provisions 
for first time offenders (Pacula et al., 2003).3   
A significant literature has developed in recent years demonstrating that consumption of 
marijuana by youths and young adults is sensitive to changes in the legal penalties associated 
with possession of marijuana (e.g., Farrelly et al., 2001; Pacula et al, 2003; Williams, 2004).  
Presumably, this effect is due to the fact that lower penalties reduce the legal risk if caught in 
possession of marijuana.  However, implicit in this interpretation is the assumption that people 
are actually aware of these reduced sanctions and are responding to them.  Aggregate data from 
the 2001 National Survey on Drug Use or Health linked to information on state laws suggests 
this may not be the case.  Pacula and colleagues (2005) show that nearly one-third of household 
respondents report that they do not know what the maximum penalty is for possession of an 
ounce of marijuana in their state and just over another third report that mandatory or possible jail 
time was the maximum penalty when they lived in a state that did not impose any jail for 
offences involving small amounts of marijuana.   The authors could not examine knowledge of 
laws by use rate using the aggregate data so it is not entirely clear that these low correlations are 
indicative of a lack of knowledge among users.  Nonetheless, they clearly indicate a lack of 
knowledge in the general household population and suggest that an alternative interpretation for 
the negative correlation between severity of penalties and use may be warranted.  For example, it 
may be the case that states that have adopted relatively lower penalties all share some 
unobserved characteristics, such as a strong belief in personal liberties or normative values, 
which are more favorable toward using marijuana.  Alternatively, it may be the case that these 
policies targeting users also inadvertently influence the risk to sellers so that lower penalties 
facing users translates into a reduced risk to sellers and thus lower marijuana prices.  Given that 
                                                 
1 MacCoun and Reuter make this claim and footnote: “This statement is a conjecture since no data sets allow the 
tracking of misdemeanor arrests to sentence.  It accords with the impressions of officials and researchers in many 
jurisdictions” (343). 
2 While decriminalization is common in the literature, we think depenalization is the more accurate term to describe 
these legal changes. See MacCoun and Reuter (2001, Chapter 5) and Pacula et al. (2005) for expositions of the 
distinction. 
3 Appendix I presents the depenalization and medicalization policies for the 29 states included in our analysis.   6
our information on marijuana prices is relatively poor, many studies have not controlled for 
marijuana prices when evaluating the effect of these policies on demand and thus the coefficient 
on the policy variable reflects the net effect (direct effect and potentially off-setting indirect 
effect). 
Medical marijuana provisions represent another area of state policy in which there has 
been substantial change in recent years (see Appendix I).  As is the case with sanctions targeting 
users, state medical marijuana laws have the potential of influencing both the supply and the 
demand for marijuana within the state.  Although it is believed that the medical marijuana market 
is relatively small (GAO, 2002; MPP 2006, Appendix F) and diversion from a relatively small 
medicinal market to a very large recreational market would normally not be expected to have any 
real impact on black market supply, current provisions for medicinal marijuana are extremely 
vague in terms of how patients are allowed to obtain marijuana.  Nine state statutes allow for 
home cultivation, while several others remain silent or allow patients to obtain marijuana through 
“any means necessary” (Pacula et al., 2002).  Large-scale diversion can easily occur in 
environments such as these where the government or some other oversight agency does not 
closely monitor the production and distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes.  More 
importantly, such ambiguity regarding source of supply creates legitimacy for illegal suppliers, 
who become the only source of marijuana for individuals unable or unwilling to grow their own.   
This legitimacy may translate into a reduction in the risk of supplying marijuana to the black 
market and a reduction in the monetary price.    
Medicinal marijuana laws could also influence the demand for recreational marijuana 
through one of three alternative mechanisms:  (1) a change in the legal risk to users of marijuana, 
(2) a change in the perceived harm associated with using marijuana, and (3) an increase in the 
social availability.  States with medical necessity defenses allow individuals who have received 
permission from a physician to use marijuana for medicinal purposes without risk of prosecution.  
Thus, these policies directly influence the legal risk of users who obtain medicinal allowances, 
although this is expected to be a very small segment of the population (GAO, 2002).  Second, 
attitudes and perceptions of marijuana as a harmful drug, which numerous studies have identified 
as an important correlate with drug use (Bachman et al., 1998; Pacula et al., 2001), are likely to 
be diminished by policies recognizing its medicinal value because these allowances formally 
recognize that marijuana can have a beneficial impact on one’s health, at least in some   7
circumstances.   Finally, medicinal allowances might also influence the social availability of 
marijuana by increasing the number of social encounters in which youths are around individuals 
who have used or are using marijuana.  Social availability can be further increased if teenagers 
live in households or near homes where patients and/or their caregivers are growing marijuana, 
as it is possible for them to share or steal the drug.   
1.2   Marijuana Markets 
Unlike the markets for cocaine and heroin, marijuana markets are relatively understudied 
and not well understood.   Although ethnographic information provides insights about how 
particular markets operate (ONDCP, 2004), very little work has been done modeling marijuana 
markets in general and virtually nothing is known about supply. This is perhaps due to the fact 
that the primary source of information used to evaluate other drug markets, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s System To Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE), is 
severely limited in two important ways when it comes to marijuana markets.  First, unlike 
observations for cocaine, heroin and other drugs included in the STRIDE database, marijuana is 
not chemically assayed when purchased or seized by agents.  Thus, the STRIDE database does 
not contain any information on marijuana purity or quality.  Second, marijuana purchase 
observations in STRIDE are highly concentrated in a single city, Washington, DC.  These two 
factors make the STRIDE data relatively less useful for examining the dynamics of these 
markets.    
Data sources providing systematic information on markets geographically dispersed 
across the nation have begun to emerge, although none contain information on purity and all of 
the information is obtained from a buyer’s perspective.  The National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH; formally, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA)) has been 
collecting information from marijuana users on their experiences in marijuana markets since 
2001 and the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Program has been asking arrestees 
about their last purchase since 2000.  Both surveys ask respondents about their drug use 
behavior, and among recent marijuana users, their methods and circumstances for procuring the 
drug.  In a recent analysis of the 2001 NHSDA data, Caulkins and Pacula (2006) show that most 
respondents who report use of marijuana in the past year obtain marijuana indoors (87 percent), 
from a friend or relative (89 percent), and for free (58 percent).   Among those who do buy their 
marijuana, these purchases generally involve small quantities (less than 10 grams), are acquired   8
from a friend (79 percent), and are exchanged indoors (62 percent).  Similar transaction 
characteristics are reported by youth (SAMHSA, 2003) and arrestees (Taylor et al., 2001) and 
are consistent with evidence obtained from ethnographic studies (ONDCP, 2004).  Thus it seems 
clear that marijuana markets function differently than that of cocaine and heroin markets 
(Caulkins et al., 1999; Caulkins and Reuter, 1998; Caulkins, 1997).  Most notably, open air 
markets and purchases from strangers are generally rare as compared to other drugs (ONDCP, 
2004), suggesting that standard street methods of drug enforcement (undercover buys and 
patrolling the streets) might not be as effective at deterring marijuana transactions.   However, 
Caulkins and Pacula identify at least two similarities between marijuana markets and other illicit 
drug markets.  First, they find evidence of quantity discounts in marijuana markets, so that 
people who buy in larger quantities pay less per gram than those who buy in smaller quantities.  
Second, they find that a minority of users account for the vast majority of purchases. 
1.3    Marijuana Prices 
There is substantial ethnographic evidence of large geographic differences in the black 
market price of marijuana (ONDCP, 2002; 2004).  For example, information reported in a recent 
summary of ethnographic studies conducted by the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) shows that an ounce of commercial-grade marijuana in Phoenix, Arizona and San 
Diego, California sold for between $60-$100, while an ounce of commercial-grade marijuana in 
New York City and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania sold for between $100-$200 in Fall 2002 
(ONDCP, 2004).  A number of factors could generate this sort of variation including differences 
in the cost of production (particularly labor, given that this is a labor-intensive commodity), 
regional differences in quality, transportation costs, imperfect information, search costs, and 
differential risks to buyers and sellers participating in the market. 
Only two studies empirically examine the role of specific factors on the prices paid for 
marijuana.  In an early study, Caulkins (1995) examines data from nine states reported in the 
Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN) and 
tests two conjectures about how prices vary from location to location within the United States.   
The first conjecture is that prices increase as one moves away from the source, which in the case 
of marijuana is largely domestic.  The second conjecture is that prices are lower in larger 
markets, as proxied by population.  He examines these hypotheses by evaluating prices for 
cocaine, LSD, and marijuana.  In the case of marijuana, Caulkins only finds support for the first   9
hypothesis.  The mean price per bulk gram paid for marijuana got statistically higher as the cities 
got more distant from the mid-west /Appalachian growing region.  These results, however, are 
based on a very limited number of price observations (fewer than 60 in total) that were not 
representative of all transactions within these states.  Thus, although they are suggestive that 
transportation costs might explain some of the geographic variation in marijuana prices, the 
evidence cannot be viewed as definitive.   
Caulkins and Pacula (2006) evaluate how differences in transaction-level characteristics 
influencing individual buyers’ and sellers’ risk correlate with the self-reported price paid per 
bulk gram of marijuana using data from the 2001 NSDUH.   Transaction-specific characteristics 
evaluated in the models include from whom they purchased (a friend, relative or stranger), where 
they purchased (inside a private dwelling, inside a public building, outside, or some other 
location), and proximity to home (near where they live).  They find that, contrary to intuition, the 
quantity-adjusted self-reported price per bulk gram is positively associated with purchases made 
in private dwellings.  Purchases made outside or inside public buildings were associated with 
lower prices on average.  They also find no association between whom they purchased from and 
price paid.  Given that the public use data contain no geographic information, their analyses 
could not account for location-specific factors.  Thus, the authors interpret this counter-intuitive 
finding as potentially reflecting omitted variable biases caused by unmeasured quality or local 
intensity of enforcement.    
Although it is possible that imperfect information and variation in search costs, 
transportation costs, production costs and quality generate some of the geographic variability in 
price, it seems implausible that variation in any of these factors could generate the substantial 
differences in marijuana street prices that are currently observed across cities.  To understand the 
relative importance of geographic differences in production/distribution costs versus the 
economic value of risks incurred, it is useful to consider the cost of producing a pound of 
marijuana in a legal market.  If marijuana were legal, then the cost of producing a pound of dried 
marijuana, which according to federal agents is approximately equivalent to the yield of a single 
plant during one growing season, would simply be the fixed cost of obtaining the plant 
(depreciated over the lifetime of the plant) plus the maintenance cost of caring for the plant 
(labor, soil, good lighting, water, and nutrients or pesticides if grown outside).  These are the 
exact same inputs needed to grow any other agricultural product, such as tomatoes or oranges,   10
which can be grown in a home garden or through mass production in certain areas.4  The trick 
with growing marijuana is identifying and separating the female plants from the male plants. 
Female plants, which contain the more potent THC, can be easily determined once a plant 
matures to a certain stage (e.g. it starts to bud).   
Given that mass production of marijuana is not allowed today, we will consider the cost 
of producing marijuana in a small home garden to keep the comparison fair, although it should 
be recognized that mass production would allow for economies of scale that are not achieved 
through home production.5  Today, a young fruit tree (showing buds) can be purchased at a 
nursery for approximately $50 while sufficient soil, nutrients, pesticides, and water for a single 
growing season could be purchased for less than $25.  Carrying this analogy forward and 
assuming that marijuana plants produce buds only once (one growing season) and the total labor 
cost involved in caring for the plant is slightly more than $100 (a maximum of 20 hours of labor 
x $5.15 minimum wage), we estimate that the maximum legal price for a pound of marijuana 
would be less than $200.6  Ethnographic data suggest that a low-end price for a pound of 
commercial grade marijuana fell in the range of $500-$700 (ONDCP, 2004).  Thus, even 
relatively low prices of marijuana are substantially higher than the back-of-the-envelope 
production cost estimate for a product being produced in a relatively low-scale effort.   Even if 
we add to this the cost of transporting the drug, it is improbable that the cost of legal marijuana 
would come anywhere near its black market price (Kleiman, 1989; 1992).    
                                                 
4 It is important to note that marijuana is a weed that grows naturally in several parts of the country, and hence the 
analogy to a home garden is not as far a field as might otherwise be considered.  Of course the quality of THC from 
a female plant grown in the wild is likely to be inferior to plants that receive special care and attention.   
5 We owe credit for insights regarding the differentiation of growing at home versus in mass production to Jonathan 
Caulkins.  
6 The total labor time involved may be greater than twenty hours, and larger estimates could be inserted without 
detracting from the point of the argument.  This estimate assumes that the opportunity cost of someone’s time is the 
federal minimum wage, which may under estimate the opportunity cost of some individuals with better employment 
opportunities.   11
2.0    Theoretical Framework 
2.1    Supply and Demand Analysis 
The impact of changing user sanctions on price depends on how it influences user and 
seller risk as well as one’s assumptions about supply.   Assumptions about supply are necessary 
as no empirical analyses examining the elasticity of supply have been conducted, so theories 
develop based on alternative plausible assumptions (e.g. Becker, Murphy, and Grossman, 2006).   
If the supply of marijuana is perfectly competitive or one presumes a relatively short run 
adjustment period, then it is appropriate to think of the supply function as infinitely elastic.  If 
state depenalization or medicalization policies truly only affect the user’s risk of using marijuana 
and not the enforcement or risks to sellers, then adoption of these policies should not influence 
the monetary price of marijuana.  
 If we assume supply is upward sloping, there are two mechanisms by which lowering the 
user sanctions could increase the retail price.  First, increase use due to lower penalties could 
shift the demand curve to the right and subsequently increase the price at least in the short run.  
Second, if relaxing user sanctions causes police officers to spend more time targeting marijuana 
sellers, then the subsequent increase in seller risk could cause the supply curve to shift in, 
resulting in higher prices.  However, there is also reason to believe that relaxing user sanctions 
will actually lower the legal risk to sellers.  This could happen if, for example, marijuana 
depenalization policies reduce the likelihood that police pursue low-end marijuana transactions 
or if sellers are able to pass themselves off as users rather than sellers (by carrying less with them 
and selling smaller consumption bundles).  There is some evidence suggesting that retail dealers 
are aware of the differential penalties and willing to use them to reduce their own legal 
consequences.  Sevigny and Caulkins (2004) report that 20% of state inmates in prison on 
charges for drug possession (or possession with intent to sale) actually self-report being retail 
sellers7  Thus, the net impact of lower sanctions on equilibrium prices is theoretically ambiguous. 
If we assume supply is downward sloping,8 lower user sanctions can only lead to higher 
retail prices if it leads to a net increase in the legal risk to sellers.  Therefore, if we hold the legal 
                                                 
7 From authors’ calculation of numbers presented in Table 1b. 
8 It has been argued that for a given level of enforcement, an increase in the number of suppliers reduces the relative 
risk facing any single supplier in the market, suggesting that the supply curve for any illicit substance is actually 
downward sloping rather than upward sloping (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986).     12
risk to sellers constant we should anticipate that a reduction in penalties should lead to a lower 
equilibrium price.   
Findings of the impact of relaxing user penalties on equilibrium prices can therefore 
provide insight into the slope of the marijuana supply curve.  If relaxing penalties leads to no 
change in prices, then the supply curve is either perfectly elastic or upward sloping (assuming 
seller risks are also affected by this change).  If relaxing penalties lowers equilibrium prices, 
supply is either downward sloping or upward sloping (which assumes the decline in sellers’ risks 
is greater than the decline in buyers’ risks).  If relaxing penalties leads to a higher equilibrium 
price, then the supply curve for marijuana must be upward sloping.   
 
2.2    Modeling the Price of Marijuana 
We begin with a simple model of the market price for marijuana (Pjt): 
(1)  Pjt = P(Djt, Sjt), 
where Djt and Sjt represent local market demand and supply in jurisdiction j at time t. Both 
supply and demand will depend on the legal risk in the jurisdiction (Ljt) as well as other factors.  
The supply of marijuana, for example, will depend on the legal risk of selling marijuana in 
jurisdiction j at time t (L
S
jt), the cost of producing and transporting the marijuana (Xjt), and the 
size of the market (Cjt): 9 
(2)  Sjt = S(L
S
j,(ACjt, SPjt), Xjt, Cjt). 
The legal risk of selling marijuana in jurisdiction j at time t is presumed to be a function of the 
risk of getting caught (ACjt) and the penalties imposed on sellers if caught (SPjt).  Because 
information on the size of the marijuana market is not readily available, we will approximate the 
size of the market (Cjt) using a vector of community-level demographic and socio-economic 
variables that are known to be correlated with demand.  Demand for marijuana in jurisdiction j at 
time t can be further specified as: 
(3)  Djt = D(Pjt, L
D
jt (ACjt, PPjt), Cjt), 
                                                 
9 Supply is currently specified presuming that individual firms are not price takers (i.e., it is not a perfectly 
competitive market).  Given the barriers to entry in the market and the ability to differentiate products, this seems 
plausible although we recognize it is an empirical question that is currently unanswered due to insufficient data on 
all aspects of production and the number of firms.   13
where L
D
jt represents the legal risks facing the user of marijuana in jurisdiction j at time t, which 
is itself a function of the probability of getting arrested and the severity of penalties facing 
buyers if caught (PPjt).  The vectors Pjt and Cjt are defined above.  
A unique feature of drug markets, however, is that a single market price is never 
observed in a given jurisdiction, as currently indicated by equation (1).  One reason for the lack 
of uniformity in price within particular markets is that there are unique risks associated with each 
individual transaction (Rijt) generated by particular decisions made by the buyers and sellers.  
Although the transaction-specific risks may be associated with the legal risks of buying or selling 
a drug in market j, there are some independent factors that can be represented as follows:  





where Tijt is a vector of variables capturing where and how the transaction took place (e.g. 
indoors, outdoors, contacted by phone, contacted on the street) for bundle i in jurisdiction j at 
time t, and I represents the information that the buyer and seller have about each other (strangers, 
friends, acquaintances), including observable characteristics of each other.  In addition to 
capturing an important part of the legal sanction associated with the transaction, vectors T and I 
reasonably capture the non-legal risks associated with a black market transaction (e.g., risk of 
robbery, risk of being swindled).  To reflect this idiosyncratic risk associated with individual 
exchanges, we modify equation (1) as follows: 
(5)  Pijt = P(Rijt Djt, Sjt). 
Substituting Eqs. (2) - (4) into Eq. (5) gives us the following reduced form equation for 
the price of marijuana for a specific transaction: 
(6)  Pijt = P(Tijt, Iijt, ACjt, SPjt, PPjt, Xjt, Cjt).10 
Fundamentally, we are interested in determining whether the vector of penalties that are 
intended to influence users (PPjt) are found to be important attributes of the monetary price of 
marijuana after controlling for all of the other factors that can influence the price for a specific 
bundle.  In this analysis, we have several different measures of the penalties that we wish to 
consider.  First, we will examine the fines and allowances for conditional discharge associated 
                                                 
10 An implicit assumption of this model, as specified here, is that the risk of arrest is the same for the buyer and 
seller.  In the empirical analysis, we will approximate the buyers’ and sellers’ risks of arrests separately, but for ease 
of exposition we group them together here.   14
with possession of small amounts of marijuana.  Then we will examine the penalties associated 
with the use and provision of medical marijuana.   
3.0 Data 
Information about marijuana transactions is obtained from the Arrestee Drug Abuse  
Monitoring (ADAM) Program (formerly Drug Use Forecasting System).  From 1987 to 2003, 
the U.S. Department of Justice interviewed arrestees in urban booking facilities about their drug 
use patterns as well as tested them for drug use.11 The purpose of the study is to provide local 
law enforcement and other local officials with reliable estimates of the prevalence of drug abuse 
and related problems in the population of arrestees in their jurisdiction.  ADAM sites were 
originally selected through applications from those jurisdictions interested in participating, but 
the number of sites increased substantially from 24 in 1996 to 43 in 2003.  ADAM data 
collection takes place four times a year at each site, usually for one or two weeks per calendar 
quarter.  Arrestees are approached within 48 hours of their arrest and asked to participate in the 
study.  Although participation in ADAM is strictly voluntary, response rates hover around 80 to 
90 percent (U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). 
  From 2000 to 2003, questions about recent drug purchases (i.e., how the dealer was 
contacted, relationship with dealer, location of transaction) were included to capture information 
about local drug markets. To isolate the effect of penalties on the price paid for marijuana, we 
limit the analysis sample in three important ways.  First, we exclude transactions where the 
marijuana was obtained with means other than cash, such as property or sex.  Second, because 
the penalties we are examining are only for possession of small amounts of marijuana, we only 
include transactions where an ounce or less was purchased.  In this way, we are able to isolate 
the effect of penalties on the retail transactions they are meant to influence. Third, we only 
consider transactions where the amount purchased was reported in grams and ounces since we 
have no way of converting “joints”, “bags”, and “packets” to grams.  
  State-level data on marijuana penalties and medicalization laws were collected by 
lawyers and policy analysts at The MayaTech Corporation (See Pacula, Chriqui, & King, 2003 
for a detailed description of the data collection procedures).12  Detailed information on the 
                                                 
11 Most of these individuals were arrested for non-drug offenses. 
12 We also used data Marijuana Policy Project (2006) for information about the implementation of medicalization 
laws in 2002 and 2003.   15
statutory implementation of the depenalization policies is available for the first three quantity 
amounts specified in each law.  In this analysis we use information on state statutory fines and 
conditional discharge provisions for possession offences involving 10 grams or less of 
marijuana.13   We limit our analysis to those arrestees who live in states where the maximum fine 
for possessing and selling marijuana is statutorily defined.  
The type of medicalization provision is important because it indicates the number of 
patients likely to be affected by the provision as well as the legal rights.  Therapeutic research 
program provisions and rescheduling laws are generally viewed as more restrictive as they are 
passive laws and do not provide active defenses to patients except if use is federally sanctioned.  
The physician recommendation laws and medical necessity defenses provide greater protection 
to patients and potentially a larger number of patients might be affected.    
These statutory laws represent one dimension of the legal risk of buying and selling 
drugs.  Another dimension is the degree of law enforcement in the area in which the drugs are 
sold.  To proxy this enforcement risk, we divide the number of marijuana arrests (for possession 
and sales separately) by the total number of arrests at the county-level.  These arrest data are 
pulled from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which collects and reports information on 
the number of arrests and crimes reported to the police for every city in the country.  While the 
shortcomings of these data are well documented (e.g. O’Brien, 1985; Maltz and Targonski, 
2002), they remain the only national source of geographically disaggregated crime and arrest 
data in the United States.14   
These ratios capture the relative importance of marijuana enforcement to police officers 
in the county and have been used in other studies (e.g., Farrelly et al., 2001; Pacula et al., 2003). 
While the ideal measure to capture enforcement would be possession arrests per unit of 
consumption, annualized consumption information is not available at the county level.  
DeSimone and Farrelly (2003) demonstrate with data from the 1990-1997 National Household 
Surveys on Drug Abuse that the effect of the probability of arrest on self-reported use rates for 
                                                 
13 States are classified as allowing conditional discharge if completion of the terms or conditions translate into a 
complete dismissal of charges. 
14 Despite problems with county-level UCR data from ICPSR and how they have been used (Maltz & Targonski, 
2002), we are comfortable using them for this analysis of large urban counties. Not only do we only consider the 
period after the ICPSR changed the imputation strategy, we also exclude observations from jurisdictions with a 
coverage indicator score less than 70. The coverage indicator is an indicator of the quality of the data made available 
to the FBI and ranges from 0 (no information) to 100 (complete information).   16
adults is negative regardless of whether they denominated by number of users or number of 
Index I arrests.  Thus, we believe marijuana arrests as a fraction of all arrests in a county is a 
reasonable proxy for the probability of being arrested for possession.  
To capture differences across counties in the demand for marijuana and size of the market 
(Jacobson, 2005), we merge data about county demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 
Information on the demographics of the county population, such as age, race/ethnic categories, 
percent male are obtained from the U.S. Census.  Information pertaining to per capita income 
and local unemployment rates are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics about these enforcement variables, as well as information about 
marijuana transactions and state penalties for the analytic sample employed here are reported in 
Table 1.  Because of the geographic dispersion of the ADAM sites, we see that the maximum 
fine for possessing 10 grams of marijuana ranges from $100 to $150,000 in our analytic 
sample.15  For this sample, the average nominal maximum fine is $16,401 and the median is 
$500.16 Almost 88 percent of arrestees in the analysis sample live in states where possession of 
10 grams can be conditionally discharged.  We focus on fines and allowances for conditional 
discharges because they have been shown to be correlated with demand in previous studies 
(Farrelly et al., 2001; DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; Pacula et al., 2003).   
Approximately 36 percent of the arrestees in the analysis sample live in states where 
there is either a provision for physicians to recommend marijuana or allowance for a medical 
necessity defense for those who use marijuana for medicinal purposes.  There also appears to be 
tremendous variation in the enforcement of marijuana laws across the ADAM counties.  For 
example, in 2000 over 10.5 percent of all arrests made in Douglas County, NE were for 
marijuana possession; the equivalent figure for Bernalillo County, NM was less than 0.4 percent 
(UCR, 2001).17   
With respect to the last marijuana purchase, roughly 49 percent of the sample bought 
from their regular source, 35 percent bought from an occasional source, and 16 percent made the 
                                                 
15 Oklahoma does not have a maximum fine for possessing 10 grams and is not included in these calculations. 
16 The average maximum fine decreases to $1,059 when observations from Arizona (where the maximum fine is 
$150,000) are omitted.  
17 These figures come from UCR, not ADAM.  Surprisingly, ADAM does not report arrests by specific drug.   17
purchase from a new source. Most buyers contacted the dealer by making a phone call or going 
to a house or apartment building.  Approximately 60 percent of the transactions occurred in a 
house, apartment, or public building and this is consistent with the claim that most marijuana 
transactions do not occur in bustling street markets (Kleiman, 1992). The price paid per bulk 
gram ranges from approximately $0.10 to $680, with the median and mean values being $4.44 
and $10.19, respectively ($2004).  This is strikingly similar to the price per bulk gram derived 
from the Drug Enforcement Administration’s System to Retrieve Information from Drug 
Evidence (2000-$9.21, 2001-$10.06, 2002-$11.65, 2003-$11.94; Caulkins et al., 2004).18 
Table 2 displays the mean prices paid per bulk gram by marijuana policy.  Using data 
from the entire sample, Panel A suggests that in states with more liberal marijuana laws 
(conditional discharge, physician recommendation, decriminalization), arrestees pay more per 
bulk gram for marijuana. Panel B examines the arrestees from three states that changed medical 
marijuana policies during the sample period (Colorado, Hawaii, and Nevada).  In almost every 
case, the mean price paid was higher after the physician recommendation or medical necessity 
law was enacted.  But since only one of the three pairwise comparisons is statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level, we cannot rule out that these differences are simply attributable to 
chance.  We also cannot rule out whether these differences are attributable to some other 
confounding factor. This motivates the multivariate analyses. 
4.0 Empirical  Specifications 
To ensure the proper specification of our models with a skewed dependent variable (See 
Figure 1), we adopt a strategy that involves the testing of both the conditional mean and mean-
variance relationship of our dependent variable (Deb, Manning and Norton, 2003).   A Box-Cox 
test is first used to determine the appropriate transformation of the dependent variables 
dependent on our controls, and findings from these tests are confirmed using Pregibon’s link test 
(Pregibon, 1980).19  Following these, we use a general linear model with a log link function:  
(7) E(PPGijt)=   
exp(δ0+Tijtδ1+ Iijtδ2 + ACjtδ3+ SPjtδ4 + PPjtδ5 +  Cjtδ6 + Yeart δ7+ Quartert δ8 +  Statejδ9 +μijt)  
                                                 
18 The average per bulk gram price for those responding to the National Household Survey on Drug Use was $5.45 
in 2001 ($2004); Caulkins and Pacula, 2006).  Since our ADAM analysis is limited to transactions <=1 ounce and 
the NHSDA is not, we attribute this discrepancy to quantity discounting.    
19 It is important to note that in running “linktest” in Stata is not always instructive. In these instances we rely 
completely on the theta from the Box-Cox test, which for this analysis is always close to 0 (link=log).   18
where PPG is the real price per bulk gram paid at the last transaction, Year, Quarter, and State 
represent a vector of dummy variables noting the year and quarter of the transaction and state 
where it occurred, and μ  is the residual. All other variables are as specified in Section 3.2. 
Once we identify the proper transformation of our dependent variables, we then 
determine the relationship between the transformed dependent variable’s mean and its variance 
using a modified Park test (1966).20  Based on the size of gamma (which is reported in the 
tables), we specify the mean-variance relationship with the Gamma distribution: 
(8) V(PPGijt) = E(PPGijt
2). 
Since we are primarily interested in the significance of state policy variables, we cluster the 
standard errors at the state-level to account for correlation among the residuals for arrestees in 
the same state.  
5.0   Results 
Table 3 models the real price per bulk gram of marijuana as a function of transaction-
level variables while controlling for time-invariant state-level characteristics.  One main finding 
is that arrestees who contact dealers by going to a private dwelling (house or apartment) 
generally pay lower prices than those who contact a dealer in public (the omitted category).   
This may represent differences in search costs in that people going to private dwellings may have 
a particular dealer in mind, while those buying in public may be looking for an available dealer 
(73% of those who contacted a dealer in public make the exchange outdoors). The coefficient on 
contacting the dealer by other means is also negative and statistically different from zero.  
We find no association between the price paid per bulk gram and whether the sale took 
place in the buyers’ neighborhood, contrary to results presented in Caulkins and Pacula (2006).  
The differential results may be due to a difference in the populations examined (arrestees versus 
a household sample) or may be due to our ability to account for regional market differences in 
this analysis which went unaccounted for in the previous analysis. 
                                                 
20 To perform a modified Park test, one runs a generalized linear model of raw y on x with link(log) and 
family(gamma), keeping both the residuals and the predicted value of y.   Then one regresses the ln(residuals 
squared) on ln(yhat) and a constant.  The value of the coefficient on the ln(yhat) term, referred to here as “gamma”, 
gives information regarding the nature of the relationship between the variance and the mean.  For example, if the 
coefficient is 0 (or not significantly different from zero), then it implies a Gaussian distribution (which has constant 
variance).  See Deb et al. (2003) for more.   19
Table 4 presents the results from models that include penalties for possessing small 
amounts of marijuana.  Because we have virtually no variation in these penalties within states 
during the time period being examined, state fixed effects are not included in the model and 
results should not be interpreted as causal.  Further, the first two columns exclude the vector of 
county-level variables which 1) do not change much from 2000-2003 and 2) effectively identify 
many of the states in our analysis sample since most states only include one ADAM site. Column 
1 begins by specifying the model without factors that may be correlated with the risks buyers and 
sellers face, such as arrest rates and sales penalties.  We find that higher maximum fines (which 
indicate higher legal costs to buyers and are associated with less use) are indeed associated with 
lower prices.  Furthermore, states that allow for dismissal of charges for first time offenders 
(conditional discharge provisions that have been shown to be positively associated with 
consumption among youth and young adults) are associated with higher prices.  These 
preliminary findings suggest that the legal risks to buyers may be important correlates of price.   
In Column 2 we include a measure of the real maximum fine associated with selling 
small amounts of marijuana.  It may be the case that states with tougher penalties on users are 
also tougher on sellers, and hence associations in the previous two regressions merely reflect 
unaccounted variation in sellers’ risks.  However, the results in Column 2 suggest that this is not 
the case as the inclusion of penalties for the sale of marijuana does not change the principal 
findings for our possession penalties and the transaction-level variables. Columns 1 and 2 still 
indicate that those who contacted the dealer at an apartment or home paid less while those who 
made the purchase in a residence paid more than those who made the exchange inside a public 
location.   
Column 3 includes the vector of county-level covariates along with the user penalties and 
the maximum fine for selling.  While the coefficient on conditional discharge remains positive 
and highly significant, it becomes roughly 50 percent smaller.  It is also important to note how 
the coefficients on the maximum fines essentially change from Column 2 to Column 3.  In 
Column 2, the coefficient on the log of the real maximum fine for possession is -0.125 and 
statistically significant while the coefficient on the log of the real maximum fine for selling is 
statistically indistinguishable from 0.  In Column 3, which includes the vector of county-level 
variables, the possession fine increases to almost 0 (-0.008) and the selling fine is now -0.16 and 
statistically significant at the one-percent level.  The instability in the coefficients on these fine   20
measures is likely attributable to the fact that they do not vary and are correlated with the county 
factors that also do not really change during our sample period.  
The ideal measure of the monetary fine associated with marijuana possession would be a 
statistic generated from assigned fines instead of statutory maximums.  However, 
geographically-disaggregated data about conviction rates and assigned fines for marijuana 
possession are simply not available. We use the statutory maximum as a proxy for the expected 
fine associated with using and buying marijuana, but realize the limits of this approach when 
using data from Arizona—which has a statutory maximum of $150,000 and accounts for almost 
10% of our ADAM sample.  Column 4 of Table 4 drops the 1,000 observations from Arizona 
and not surprisingly, the maximum fine is no longer significant. Despite the smaller sample, the 
coefficient on conditional discharge is still positive and significant.  The remaining columns in 
Table 4 exclude observations from Arizona. 
Next, we introduce an indicator variable for the 11 “decriminalization” states that 
reduced criminal sanctions for marijuana possession in the 1970s.21  While recent research 
suggests the traditional interpretation of this variable as a measure of the legal risk is wrong, 
decriminalization status remains an important correlate of demand even when measures of the 
legal risk are included in the analysis (Pacula, Chriqui, & King, 2003). One interpretation of the 
robustness of the decriminalization variable to the inclusion of other measures of legal risk is that 
this policy more accurately reflects unobserved differences in the enforcement of the policy or 
differences in unobserved state sentiment toward marijuana. Another interpretation is that it is an 
information effect in that users/potential users may see decriminalization as a clear signal of 
weaker penalties, even if the penalties are not that different from states that have not 
decriminalized. The coefficient on decriminalization in Column 5 is positive and significant and 
does not minimize the practical and statistical significance of the conditional discharge variable.  
In fact, the inclusion of decriminalization actually increases the coefficient on conditional 
discharge.  The fact that both conditional discharge and decriminalization are positively 
associated with price lends further support to the conclusion that shifts in demand will influence 
price.  However, one cannot rule out the possibility that these policies might also influence risk 
to sellers because of corresponding shifts in enforcement that accompany the policy itself. 
                                                 
21 While Arizona is often referred to as a decriminalization state because of policy changes in 1996, it does not 
matter for Columns 4-6 since observations from Arizona are excluded.   21
Column 6 includes county-level enforcement measures from the Uniform Crime Reports.  
These enforcement measures should provide a better approximation of the general enforcement 
risk, and hence expected penalty, associated with any transaction.  In addition, by including 
measures of enforcement risk in the model, we can evaluate the impact of the demand-side 
policies holding enforcement (at least arrest rates) constant.  After including these variables, the 
coefficients on conditional discharge and dealer contact remain statistically significant with 
smaller absolute values.  The negative sign on the ratio of marijuana possession arrests to all 
arrests is consistent with the hypothesis that as expected sanction for possession increases, price 
decreases via a shift in demand.   While we find no significant association between sales arrests 
on price per gram, it does make sense that the coefficient is positive. 
In general, Tables 3 and 4 support the notion that the market prices for marijuana are 
sensitive to transaction risks.  Moreover, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis 
that users’ risks, which are at least partially determined by demand-side policies regarding 
possession penalties for marijuana, are also important correlates of equilibrium price.  However, 
there are at least two limitations of the analyses presented thus far.  First, the results presented in 
Table 4 are based entirely on cross-sectional variation in policies.  Thus, unobserved state factors 
that are correlated with penalties for possession of marijuana may be driving the associations in 
Table 4 rather than a real penalty effect.  Second, all of the state laws evaluated thus far could 
also influence the risk faced by sellers if dealers can effectively hide themselves as users or if 
enforcement of low-end marijuana transactions changes as a result of these policies.    
In light of these limitations, we also consider the influence of state medical marijuana 
laws on equilibrium prices in Table 5.  Unlike the penalties for possession, there has been some 
variation in state medical marijuana laws within the states even within our short time period 
being examined; thus, it is possible to include state fixed effects in our models that account for 
other unobserved state factors that might be associated with the policy and price.  Moreover, 
state medical marijuana laws are supposed to create protection for medical users, but not provide 
protection to drug dealers and organized marijuana sellers.    
Columns 1 through 7 of Table 5 include an indicator variable that equals 1 if the state 
actively allows physician recommendation and/or medical necessity defense.22  This measure 
                                                 
22 See Appendix I for the list of states that allow physician recommendation and/or medical necessity defense.   22
captures policies that protect physicians and/or their patients from state prosecution for 
discussing, recommending, or using marijuana as medicine.  The models are first evaluated 
excluding state fixed effects so that comparison with results in Table 4 can be directly made.  In 
Columns 3-4 other state penalty measures are included and in Columns 5-7 the enforcement 
measures are incorporated.  Across the board, the coefficient on physician recommendation/ 
medical necessity defense is positive and statistically significant. In the specification with state 
fixed effects, enforcement controls, county-, transaction-, and individual-level characteristics 
(Column 6), the results suggest that arrestees in states with active medical marijuana programs 
pay $1.40 more for a gram of marijuana compared to arrestees in non-medical states.23 
In Column 7, the natural log of the county population is included as a regressor.  This 
provides another proxy for market demand and allows us to test Caulkins’s conjecture (1995) 
and Jacobson’s (2005) finding that the price is lower in larger markets.  The coefficient and 
standard error on physician recommendation/medical necessity defense remains virtually 
unchanged. The coefficient on county population is negative and statistically significant, thus 
confirming the hypothesis that price per gram in lower in larger markets. 
Since laws that allow physicians to recommend marijuana or patients to use a medical 
necessity defense will primarily influence consumers (rather than dealers),24 the positive 
association with price suggests that the market supply curve for marijuana is upward sloping 
because a change in demand leads to an increase in equilibrium prices.  It is important to note, 
however, that all states with recommendation/medical necessity laws also have provisions for 
home cultivation. If allowances for home cultivation reduced the risk to sellers of producing 
marijuana, then prices should fall holding other factors constant.  But because we see an overall 
positive effect of these policies on price, it suggests that the shift in demand exceeds the shift in 
supply that could occur with a reduction in risk to sellers.    
Finally, to address any remaining concerns that sellers’ risk—instead of buyers’ risk—is 
driving our results, Table 6 reports how the state beer tax is related to the price paid by arrestees.  
Previous research finds a negative relationship between the beer tax and marijuana prevalence 
(e.g., Pacula, 1997) and several studies find alcohol and marijuana to be economic complements 
                                                 
23 $2004. This marginal effect was calculated with the mfx command in State 9.2. 
24  It could reduce the risk to suppliers (e.g., of being informed on by users trying to reduce their legal costs) which 
could again lead to an increase in supply and lower price, making the net price effect ambiguous.   23
in the United States (Farrelly et al., 1999; Pacula, 1998; Saffer & Chaloupka, 1999; Williams et 
al., 2004).  Since there is variation in the state beer tax during our analysis period, we can use 
state-fixed effects to control for the unobservable state-level characteristics that influence 
marijuana prices and do not change over time.25  In Column 1 we find a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the real beer tax and the real price paid per bulk gram, 
suggesting that reducing demand for alcohol, and subsequently marijuana, reduces the 
equilibrium price for marijuana.  In Column 2 we include the marijuana enforcement variables 
and the results do not change. 
In Column 3 we add in a vector of county-level demographic and economic 
characteristics, and not surprising, the coefficient on the state beer tax is no longer significant 
(the t-statistic is -1.25).  As mentioned before, many of the states in our analysis sample only 
include one ADAM site; thus, saturating the model with too many state- and county-level 
variables will increase the standard error on the coefficient for the state beer tax (especially given 
our short time frame and the minimal variation).  It is reassuring, however, to note that the beer 
tax coefficient remains negative as we would expect. So although not definitive, Table 6 does 
provide additional support for the claim that the supply curve for marijuana is upward sloping. 
6.0  Discussion 
This paper finds that variations in policies associated with user risk are associated with 
variations in self-reported marijuana prices per gram.  Results exploiting cross-sectional 
variation in possession penalties suggest that states with lower penalties have higher prices due 
to increased demand that more than offsets the effect on price of any increase in supply. This 
provides new evidence that user sanctions can influence demand.  Given the variation examined 
is purely cross-sectional, the direction of causality is not entirely certain.  Thus, we also examine 
state medical marijuana laws and using within state temporal variation in the adoption of liberal 
marijuana policies, we find evidence that policies aimed at users do in fact lead to changes in 
prices in a fashion that is consistent with anticipated shifts in demand.  Robustness checks that 
examine changes in beer taxes generally, but not definitively, support the conclusion that supply 
is upward sloping in these markets. 
                                                 
25 Changes in Alaska in 2002, Nebraska in 2003, Nevada in 2003, New York in 2001 and 2003, Tennessee in 2002, 
Utah in 2003 (Brewers Almanac)   24
There are a number of plausible explanations for an upward sloping supply curve for 
marijuana even in the long run.  As was discussed previously and has been published elsewhere 
(Kleiman, 1990; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986), a substantial fraction of the monetary price of 
marijuana represents the economic value of risk associated with engaging in an illicit market.   
Although it is frequently presumed in other areas of economics that producers are risk-neutral, 
such a notion is inconsistent with empirical evidence showing that marijuana sellers receive large 
compensation for incurring risk in bringing the drug to market.  A more plausible assumption is 
that producers of marijuana are not risk-neutral.26   If we further presume that the population of 
potential suppliers to the market has heterogeneous risk preferences, it is easy to identify a 
potential barrier to entry into this market - the risk premium.  If the current monetary 
compensation for incurring risk is relatively low, then some potential suppliers may choose to 
stay out of the market.   Only by increasing the risk premium (and hence monetary price of 
supplying the good) will new suppliers decide to enter the market.   
An upward sloping supply curve could also exist if input prices rise with increases in 
output.  Although in legal markets rising input prices are relatively less common for agricultural 
products, the illicit nature of the marijuana market means that suppliers need to compensate field 
workers for the risk they incur participating in the production of an illegal good.  If individuals 
who make up the potential pool of laborers have heterogeneous preferences in risk, then it is 
possible that input costs could rise with the level of production as those with the lower risk 
preference will have to be paid a higher premium to be enticed to work in this market versus a 
legal market.  The extent to which heterogeneous risk preferences among potential laborers could 
influence the cost of production depends on the distribution of high and low risk preferences in 
the population of workers and the relative tax imposed on legitimate wages. 
There are a number of important caveats that need to be considered when interpreting 
these results.  First, the data that are employed in this study are drawn from a convenience 
sample of what is presumed to be heavy and/or regular users who are frequently engaged in the 
marijuana market.  We do not know to what extent purchases described here are representative of 
the full population of purchases made in the market.  Furthermore, we only observe purchases 
over a small window of time (16 quarters over the course of 4 years). However, these ADAM 
                                                 
26 Even if all suppliers are risk averse, the supply function will slope upwards if their risk premiums vary.   25
data do represent a very good source of information on marijuana prices in the U.S., as it is clear 
that arrestees are frequent users who engage regularly in the market (Caulkins and Pacula, 2006).   
A second and perhaps more important limitation of the study is the lack of information on 
the quality of marijuana.  The omission of information on quality is clearly important because it 
is possible that several transaction-specific characteristics that we interpret as indicative of risk 
are also highly correlated with quality.  To the extent that certain transaction patterns are highly 
correlated with the quality of marijuana (e.g. high quality marijuana purchased indoors and only 
sold to regular customers), then there may be some bias in interpreting the transaction 
coefficients as measuring differences in risk.  However, unless the quality of marijuana is 
systematically correlated with state-level policies, it is not clear how the omission of quality 
from this analysis could potentially bias the findings regarding the effect of state policies. 
While the finding of an upward sloping supply curve in marijuana markets may not be 
surprising, it does have important implications for thinking about the impact of changing user 
sanctions in illegal drug markets.  First, it suggests that price effects may offset some of the 
policy effects of reducing legal risk to users on demand.  This helps us better understand the 
small and sometimes statistically insignificant coefficients on policy variables in previous 
demand analyses.  Second, it suggests that lowering legal risks for users are associated with 
higher marijuana prices, which ceteris parabis, implies higher profits for drug dealers in the 
short-run.  Evaluating the welfare and moral implications of increasing profits for dealers is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that the increase in profits could lead to 
a rise in the number of dealers in the long run if barriers to entry, such as heterogeneous risk 
preferences across sellers, do not exist.  
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Table 1. 
Summary statistics for ADAM arrestees who purchased <=1oz marijuana with cash only 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Conditional discharge allowed for possessing 10g  10370 0.879267 0.325832  0  1 
Nominal maximum fine for possessing 10g  9708 16401.29  45297.62  100  150000 
Classified as a "decriminalization" state  10370 0.506461 0.499982  0  1 
Nominal maximum fine for selling 10g  9984 49410.8 106000.7  100  500000 
Physician recommendation or medical necessity  10370 0.355641  0.47873  0  1 
Current Therapeutic Research Program  10370 0.422758 0.494022  0  1 
Nominal beer tax  10370 0.25068 0.184921  0.06  1.07 
MJ possession arrests/All arrests (FBI-CI>=70)  8579 0.046083  0.024306 0.001656  0.123499 
MJ sales arrests/All arrests (FBI-CI>=70)  8579 0.004946  0.003898  0.0003  0.027496 
Nominal transaction cost  10370 46.14262 78.58991  1  4500 
Total grams purchased  10370 10.23567 9.380081  0.05  28.35 
Real price per bulk gram (1982-84=100)  10370 5.393351 15.58225 0.059752 361.3777 
Purchased in buyer's neighborhood  10370 0.400675 0.490059  0  1 
Purchased from regular source  10370 0.487175  0.49986  0  1 
Purchased from occasional source  10370 0.34783 0.476305  0  1 
Purchased from a new source  10370 0.164995 0.371194  0  1 
Contacted dealer: By phone or page  10370 0.43163 0.495327  0  1 
Contacted dealer:  Go to house or apt.  10370 0.236741 0.425102  0  1 
Contacted dealer:  Approached in public  10370 0.200675 0.400525  0  1 
Contacted dealer:  Other method  10370 0.130955 0.337367  0  1 
Purchase location: In a house or apartment  10370 0.608197 0.488177  0  1 
Purchase location: Public--Indoors  10370 0.12189 0.327175  0  1 
Purchase location: Public--Outdoors  10370 0.269913 0.443936  0  1 
Male  10370 0.923722 0.265455  0  1 
Age 20 or less  10370 0.224976 0.417587  0  1 
Age 21 to 25  10370 0.282642 0.450306  0  1 
Age 26 to 35  10370 0.293057 0.455186  0  1 
Age 36 or more  10370 0.199325 0.399512  0  1 
White  10370 0.478206 0.499549  0  1 
Black  10370 0.295178 0.456145  0  1 
Asian  10370 0.00974 0.098213  0  1 
Other race  10370 0.216876 0.412137  0  1 
Hispanic  10370 0.168081 0.373956  0  1 
Married  10370 0.158631 0.365349  0  1 
Employed  10370 0.600579 0.489803  0  1 
High School Graduate or GED  10370 0.717454 0.450259  0  1 
Unemployment rate  10370 5.10082 1.344728  2.5  8.6 
Real per capita personal income  10370  19482.71 4807.44 8751.452  49842.63 
% Male  10370 0.493118 0.010507 0.464833 0.508659 
% Black  10370 0.131806  0.1197  0.004654 0.682782 
% White  10370 0.779675 0.128884 0.258181 0.982966 
% American Indian  10370 0.01727 0.019336 0.002377  0.151804 
% Asian  10370 0.071249 0.099024 0.004632 0.706677 
% Hispanic  10370 0.163728 0.136527 0.015745 0.945625 
% Age 0 to 17  10370 0.254745 0.023368 0.167865 0.367887 
% Age 18 to 24  10370 0.098556 0.009748  0.07286  0.128117 
% Age 25 to 34  10370  0.156673 0.01792 0.116671  0.215978 
% Over 34  10370 0.490026 0.028068 0.366178  0.5502 
County FIPS  10370 25723.81 17332.54  1073  53063 
State FIPS  10370 25.66538  17.3278  1  53 
Quarter  10370 2.46297 1.090481  1  4 
Year  10370 2001.551 1.090885  2000  2003 
*  
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Table 2. 
Price paid per bulk gram of marijuana by arrestees subject to different policies ($2004) 
 
  No policy  With policy   
Panel A: Price paid by arrestees under different state laws 
Mean $6.55  $10.69  *** 
Conditional discharge 
N 1252 9118   
Mean $6.91  $16.13  ***  Physician recommendation / 
Medical necessity  N 6682 3688   
Mean $9.54  $10.81  ** 
Decriminalization 
N 5118 5252   
Panel B: Prices paid by arrestees in states that changed physician 
recommendation/medical necessity laws since 2000 
Mean $3.59  $4.87  * 
Colorado 
N 94  297   
Mean $18.11  $23.44  
Hawaii 
N 13  143   
Mean $7.78  $9.17  
Nevada 
N 233  239   
  
Note:  All figures are adjusted for inflation and reported in $2004. A two-sample t test is used to compare means.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     31
Table 3.   
GLM Estimates of Log Real Price Per Bulk Gram: Transaction Information 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
0.042 0.047  0.028  0.030  Purchased from occasional source 
[0.053] [0.055]  [0.051]  [0.050] 
0.027 0.038  -0.014  -0.009  Purchased from a new source 
[0.071] [0.068]  [0.072]  [0.072] 
-0.027 -0.027  -0.023  -0.023  Purchased in buyer's neighborhood 
[0.063] [0.063]  [0.059]  [0.059] 
 -0.022    -0.095  Purchased in Public--Indoor 
 [0.081]    [0.086] 
 -0.049    -0.124  Purchased in Public--Outdoor 
 [0.061]    [0.079] 
   0.046  -0.014  Contact dealer: Phone or pager 
   [0.051]  [0.073] 
   -0.094*  -0.179**  Contact dealer: Go to house or apt. 
   [0.051]  [0.081] 
   0.287***  0.249**  Contact dealer: Other method 
   [0.085]  [0.097] 
     0.076  Bought directly from dealer 
     [0.090] 
-2.842 -2.715  -5.003  -5.085  Constant 
[6.339] [6.386]  [5.821]  [5.706] 
        
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County-level variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual-level variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter and year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 10370  10370  10370  10370 
Gamma from Modified Park test  1.97  1.97  2.07  2.09 
BIC -85422  -85228  -85339  -85334 
 
Notes:  All models estimated using GLM with link(log) and family(Gamma).  Individual-level variables include Male, Age 21 to 
25, Age 26 to 35, Age 36 or more, Black, Asian, Other race, Hispanic, Married, Employed, and High School Graduate or GED.  
County-level variables include Unemployment rate, Real per capita personal income, % Male, % Black, % American Indian,% 
Asian, % Hispanic, % Age 0 to 17, % Age 25 to 34,  and % Over 34.  Reference groups:  Source (Regular source), Contact 
(Approached in public), Purchase location (In a house or apartment). Standard errors clustered at the state-level in all models. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32
Table 4.   
GLM Estimates of Log Real Price Per Bulk Gram: User Penalties 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
0.847*** 0.776*** 0.370*** 0.516*** 0.605*** 0.390***  Conditional discharge allowed for possessing 10g 
[0.189] [0.228] [0.094] [0.196] [0.201] [0.134] 
-0.156*** -0.125**  -0.008  -0.056  0.004  0.065  Ln(Real maximum fine for possessing 10g) 
[0.029] [0.054] [0.016] [0.069] [0.054] [0.047] 
 -0.048  -0.162***        Ln(Real maximum fine for selling 10g) 
 [0.051]  [0.012]      
     0.257**  0.540***  Classified as a decriminalization state 
     [0.131]  [0.149] 
      -8.721***  MJ possession arrests/All arrests 
      [3.038] 
      6.202  MJ sales arrests/All arrests 
      [12.314] 
0.059 0.029 0.002 0.073 0.061  0.120**  Purchased from occasional source 
[0.055] [0.053] [0.053] [0.060] [0.061] [0.060] 
-0.002 -0.012 -0.043 -0.045 -0.046 -0.022  Purchased from a new source 
[0.085] [0.090] [0.082] [0.088] [0.090] [0.103] 
0.055 0.071 0.025 0.039 0.035 0.010  Purchased in buyer's neighborhood 
[0.065] [0.068] [0.062] [0.059] [0.062] [0.058] 
-0.056 -0.097 -0.102 -0.108 -0.086 -0.034  Contact dealer: Phone or pager 
[0.088] [0.088] [0.073] [0.076] [0.076] [0.077] 
-0.269*** -0.301*** -0.286*** -0.272*** -0.258***  -0.191**  Contact dealer: Go to house or apt. 
[0.086] [0.086] [0.074] [0.081] [0.082] [0.083] 
0.141*  0.130 0.122 0.128 0.155 0.190  Contact dealer: Other method 
[0.084] [0.090] [0.089] [0.098] [0.104] [0.124] 
-0.161** -0.217***  -0.214***  -0.158*  -0.154*  -0.089  Purchased in Public--Indoor 
[0.079] [0.052] [0.057] [0.088] [0.088] [0.101] 
-0.105  -0.108  -0.149* -0.173** -0.163*  -0.092  Purchased in Public--Outdoor 
[0.094] [0.093] [0.081] [0.085] [0.087] [0.097] 
0.077 0.054 0.103  0.151*  0.152*  0.218***  Bought directly from dealer 
[0.103] [0.102] [0.091] [0.083] [0.082] [0.073] 
2.032*** 2.396***  3.358  5.261  6.676*  13.669***  Constant 
[0.281] [0.265] [3.247] [3.939] [3.509] [2.815] 
        
State fixed effects  No No No No No No 
County-level variables  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual-level  variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  9708 9322 9322 8708 8708 6917 
Gamma from Modified Park test  1.75 1.68 1.85 1.68 1.76 1.82 
BIC  -77446 -74107 -75346 -69293 -69341 -53125 
 
Notes:  All models estimated using GLM with link(log) and family(Gamma). Columns 4-6 do not include 1,000 observations 
from Arizona. The sample size decreases by an additional 1,791 observations in Column 6 because enforcement data are limited 
to jurisdictions with UCR Coverage Indicator scores >=70.  Individual-level variables include Male, Age 21 to 25, Age 26 to 35, 
Age 36 or more, Black, Asian, Other race, Hispanic, Married, Employed, and High School Graduate or GED.  County-level 
variables include Unemployment rate, Real per capita personal income, % Male, % Black, % American Indian,% Asian, % 
Hispanic, % Age 0 to 17, % Age 25 to 34,  and % Over 34. Reference groups:  Source (Regular source), Contact (Approached in 
public), Purchase location (In a house or apartment). Standard errors clustered at the state-level in all models.  * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5. 
GLM Estimates of Log Real Price Per Bulk Gram: Medical Marijuana 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
              
0.872*** 0.729*** 0.669*** 0.574*** 0.771***  0.165*  0.160*  Physician recommendation or medical necessity 
[0.133] [0.160] [0.172] [0.136] [0.118] [0.086]  [0.086] 
   0.139        Current Therapeutic Research Program 
   [0.144]       
    0.432***       Conditional discharge for possessing 10g 
    [0.138]      
    0.057       Ln(Real maximum fine for possessing 10g) 
    [0.043]      
    0.155*       Classified as a decriminalization state 
    [0.089]      
     -7.706***  -1.638  -1.777  MJ possession arrests/All arrests 
     [1.960]  [4.042]  [4.167] 
     14.778  25.282  30.306  MJ sales arrests/All arrests 
     [9.057]  [18.247]  [18.646] 
       -0.119**  Ln(County population) 
       [0.054] 
0.038 0.020 0.018 0.041 0.073 0.072  0.071  Purchased from occasional source 
[0.053] [0.051] [0.051] [0.058] [0.052] [0.054]  [0.054] 
-0.041 -0.054 -0.059 -0.058 -0.033 -0.018  -0.019  Purchased from a new source 
[0.083] [0.082] [0.081] [0.092] [0.087] [0.084]  [0.084] 
0.000 -0.029 -0.029 0.004 -0.053  -0.050  -0.050  Purchased in buyer's neighborhood 
[0.064] [0.060] [0.060] [0.066] [0.052] [0.053]  [0.053] 
-0.072 -0.051 -0.053 -0.082 -0.002 0.007 0.008  Contact dealer: Phone or pager 
[0.080] [0.080] [0.078] [0.078] [0.079] [0.077]  [0.077] 
-0.263*** -0.233*** -0.234*** -0.245*** -0.162**  -0.133  -0.131  Contact dealer: Go to house or apt. 
[0.091] [0.086] [0.084] [0.085] [0.081] [0.084]  [0.084] 
0.166* 0.225**  0.220** 0.168* 0.241**  0.262**  0.265**  Contact dealer: Other method 
[0.091] [0.106] [0.105] [0.101] [0.117] [0.109]  [0.109] 
-0.119 -0.127 -0.130 -0.150* -0.069 -0.067  -0.067  Purchased in Public--Indoor 
[0.090] [0.087] [0.086] [0.085] [0.099] [0.101]  [0.101] 
-0.120 -0.130 -0.128 -0.157* -0.065 -0.079  -0.077  Purchased in Public--Outdoor 
[0.098] [0.087] [0.086] [0.089] [0.089] [0.088]  [0.088] 
0.119 0.092 0.097 0.146* 0.134 0.126  0.130  Bought directly from dealer 
[0.096] [0.088] [0.088] [0.084] [0.096] [0.093]  [0.093] 
1.413*** 8.293*  6.389 12.968*** 16.503*** 19.142** 13.379*  Constant 
[0.228] [4.765] [4.907] [3.537] [3.492] [7.491]  [7.892] 
              
State fixed effects  No  No No No No  Yes  Yes 
County-level variables  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Individual-level variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter and year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              
Observations 10370  10370  10370  8708  8579  8579  8579 
Gamma from Modified Park test 1.64  1.70  1.74  1.77  1.95  2.16  2.15 
BIC -84022  -84686  -84699  -69564  -68280  -68507  -68500 
Notes:  All models estimated using GLM with link(log) and family(Gamma). Column 4 does not include 1,000 observations 
from Arizona and 662 observations from states that do not have a maximum fine for possessing 10 grams. The sample size 
decreases by 1,791 observations in Columns 5-7 because enforcement data are limited to jurisdictions with UCR Coverage 
Indicator scores >=70.  Individual-level variables include Male, Age 21 to 25, Age 26 to 35, Age 36 or more, Black, Asian, Other 
race, Hispanic, Married, Employed, and High School Graduate or GED.  County-level variables include Unemployment rate, 
Real per capita personal income, % Male, % Black, % American Indian,% Asian, % Hispanic, % Age 0 to 17, % Age 25 to 34,  
and % Over 34. Reference groups:  Source (Regular source), Contact (Approached in public), Purchase location (In a house or 
apartment). Standard errors clustered at the state-level in all models.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.   34
Table 6. 
GLM Estimates of Log Real Price Per Bulk Gram: Real Beer Tax 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
-0.742*** -0.704***  -0.486  Real beer tax 
[0.153] [0.211] [0.388] 
 -2.535  -0.697  MJ possession arrests/All arrests 
 [2.814]  [3.549] 
 43.902**  20.153  MJ sales arrests/All arrests 
 [18.204]  [16.468] 
0.034 0.072 0.073  Purchased from occasional source 
[0.052] [0.054] [0.054] 
-0.014 -0.025 -0.020  Purchased from a new source 
[0.073] [0.085] [0.083] 
-0.022 -0.051 -0.049  Purchased in buyer's neighborhood 
[0.060] [0.056] [0.053] 
-0.007 0.026 0.007  Contact dealer: Phone or pager 
[0.074] [0.077] [0.077] 
-0.181** -0.123  -0.133  Contact dealer: Go to house or apt. 
[0.081] [0.083] [0.084] 
0.254** 0.283** 0.262**  Contact dealer: Other method 
[0.104] [0.115] [0.108] 
-0.087 -0.057 -0.067  Purchased in Public--Indoor 
[0.088] [0.101] [0.101] 
-0.117 -0.063 -0.079  Purchased in Public--Outdoor 
[0.082] [0.090] [0.089] 
0.073 0.129 0.122  Bought directly from dealer 
[0.089] [0.091] [0.092] 
1.644*** 1.590*** 20.026**  Constant 
[0.179] [0.321] [9.491] 
      
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County-level variables  No  No  Yes 
Individual-level variables Yes  Yes  Yes 
Quarter and year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations 10730  8579  8579 
Gamma from Modified Park test  2.03  2.08  2.15 
BIC -85326  -68506  -68504 
 
Notes:  All models estimated using GLM with link(log) and family(Gamma). The sample size decreases by 1,791 observations in 
Columns 2-3 because enforcement data are limited to jurisdictions with UCR Coverage Indicator scores >=70.  Individual-level 
variables include Male, Age 21 to 25, Age 26 to 35, Age 36 or more, Black, Asian, Other race, Hispanic, Married, Employed, and 
High School Graduate or GED.  County-level variables include Unemployment rate, Real per capita personal income, % Male, % 
Black, % American Indian,% Asian, % Hispanic, % Age 0 to 17, % Age 25 to 34,  and % Over 34. Reference groups:  Source 
(Regular source), Contact (Approached in public), Purchase location (In a house or apartment). Standard errors clustered at the 
state-level in all models.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. 
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Note:  N=10,256. For display purposes we do not include the 114 observation with RPPG>$100.  36
Appendix I.   




















Alabama  135  Yes  $2,000        Yes    
Alaska  367 Yes  $1,000 Yes  Yes      Yes 
Arizona  1,000  Yes  $150,000  Yes          
California  1,384 Yes  $100 Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Colorado  391     $100  Yes  Yes*     Yes* 
Wash DC  17  Yes  $1,000             
Florida  172  Yes  $1,000             
Georgia  168 Yes  $1,000      Yes   
Hawaii  156  Yes  $1,000     Yes*     Yes* 
Illinois  137  Yes  $1,500        Yes    
Indiana  461  Yes  $5,000             
Iowa  303  Yes  $1,000             
Louisiana  107  Yes  $500             
Massachusetts  15  Yes  $500        Yes    
Michigan  114  Yes  $2,000             
Minnesota  386  Yes  $300*  Yes     Yes    
Missouri  30   $1,000        
Nebraska  329  Yes  $100  Yes          
Nevada  472  Yes  $5,000     Yes*     Yes* 
New Mexico  303  Yes  $100        Yes    
New York  397     $100  Yes     Yes    
North Carolina  188 Yes  $200 Yes       
Ohio  434     $100  Yes          
Oklahoma  662 Yes  NA         
Oregon  376 Yes  $1,000 Yes  Yes      Yes 
Pennsylvania  94  Yes  $500             
Texas  577  Yes  $2,000        Yes    
Utah  313  Yes  $1,000             
Washington  882 Yes  $250      Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: * Denotes change during sample period.  Arizona and Louisiana have physician prescription laws on the 
books, they are purely symbolic and do not afford medical users legal protection (MPP 2006).  In Arizona, a law 
was signed in 1997 which required all drugs dispensed as medicine must be approved by the federal FDA (New York 
Times, 1997).  This, in essence, repealed the medical marijuana law (Annas, 1997).  
 
 
 